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ADMINISTRATION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
By Alvix L. Park
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, ES the Taft-
Hartlev Act is officially named, marked a drastic change in federal
regulation of industrial relations. In the twelve years since the pas-
sage of the preceding National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB
and the courts had built up a body of interpretive decisions so that
there was little doubt as to the real meaning of the law. There was
an established ruling covering almost any union-management
situation.
Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, added new pro-
visions and amendments to the original Wagner Act. This meant,
of course, that the Act's real meaning would depend upon the inter-
pretation of these provisions by the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts.
To some extent, interpretations under the Wagner ^Vct remained,
to be modified to conform with the way in which the law, as written,
was modified. For example, the Board relied on past decisions de-
termining an employer's refusal to bargain in good faith, in deciding
whether or not a union was bargaining in good faith under the pro-
visions of the new Act.
Recent actions in Congress indicate that the Taft-Hartley Act
may be revised. As a result, some of the decisions described in this
bulletin may no longer appl>'. But whate\er the future of the Act,
these administrative rulings and court decisions have become
history. Like previous rulings under the Wagner Act, they will
serve as a precedent to be followed or changed as the Act remains
the same or is rewritten. And since these rulings are an important
part of the law in operation, they doubtless will be carefully con-
sidered by the framers of new labor legislation. The record, then,
is worth presenting.
When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, what it would mean, in
use, was anybody's guess. And almost everyone concerned with in-
dustrial relations guessed. This speculation resulted, in part, from
the complicated nature of the Act. It is long. Its thirty i)ages of
print are sprinkled with "sub-sections of sub-sections." and it was
popularly referred to as the lawyers' dream.
Some provisions were more hotly debated than others. These
were union unfair labor practices, the use of injunctions, the repre-
sentation and election procedures, the damage suit provisions, cover-
age of the Act, constitutionality of the affidavit requirement, and
the ban on political expenditures.
The purpose of this bulletin is to discuss those provisions of the
Act on which the NLRB and the courts have made important inter-
pretations affecting the operation of the Act. This is not an attempt
to analyze the entire statute. There have been many such explana-
tions, most of which have dealt with the law as written rather than
as interpreted by administrative and judicial bodies. (A brief sum-
mary of the major provisions of the Act is contained in the ILIR
Bulletin, "Federal Labor Legislation, 1947." A subsequent bulletin
will deal with the effects of the law on employers, labor unions, and
government practices in industrial relations.)
This bulletin, which covers the period from the passage of the
Act to the end of 1948, will not attempt to present all of the
cases that have been handled by the Board and the courts. We will
deal only with those cases in which real interpretive decisions of the
law have been made. We will also mention, however, those pro-
visions of the Act about which no definite pattern has as yet been
established by administrative or legal action.
WORK LOAD OF THE BOARD
The number of cases from which these few^ important decisions
are taken has reached an impressive total. From August 22, 1947,
the date v^^hen most of the provisions of the Act became effective,
to December 31, 1948, there were 51,991 cases filed with the NLRB.
Of these, 45,881 were processed, leaving a backlog of 6,110
cases. It is important to note that the great bulk of these cases are
petitions for union shop elections. (The Act provides that before
a union shop clause can be included in a contract, a majority of all
the employees eligible to vote must vote affirmatively for such a
clause in an NLRB-conducted election. Upon receipt of a petition
signed by thirty per cent or more of the bargaining unit, the Board
then arranges and conducts a secret ballot on the question.) As of
December 31, 1948, 35,646 union shop cases had been filed. In these
cases the XLRB procedure is routine. No significant interpretive
ruling has been made on any union shop case.
Of the remaining cases filed, most of them were concerned with
representation and election procedures. There were 9,918 repre-
sentation cases and 645 decertification petitions. (In questions of
representation, the Act states that when a union has made a claim
that it represents a majority of the employees, any individual,
group of individuals, labor organization, or employer may petition
the Board for a certification election. ) The Board then holds hear-
ings, and if it finds a question of representation exists, it conducts
an election and certifies the organization receiving a majority of
the votes as the bargaining agent. Decertification petitions, which
claim that the union no longer represents a majority of the em-
ployees, may be filed by any individual. The Board then conducts
hearings and holds an election to see if the union is to be removed
as the bargaining agent for the unit. In both certification and de-
certification cases, no election can be held when a valid election
has been conducted within the preceding twelve-month period.
Although the employer's right to request a certification election, in
certain instances, is written into the statute, only 697 of 9,918
representation cases were filed by employers, while 9,221 were filed
by unions. A number of interpretive board and court cases have been
decided on this question. These include the issues of union affidavit
requirements, strikers' voting eligibility, and other voting and
petitioning rules.
The remaining 6.782 cases of the total 51,991 of all kinds of
cases that were filed by December 31, 1948, were unfair labor
practice cases. Of these, about one-fifth, or 1,256 cases were unfair
labor practice charges filed against unions (a new provision in the
Taft-Hartley Act). In the remaining four-fifths, or 5,526 cases,
unfair labor practices were charged against employers. Because this
latter provision was a part of the original National Labor Relations
Act, and there were already established administrative rulings on
this provision, the bulk of new rulings dealt with union unfair labor
practices.
Few cases have come up under the question of what industries
and actions are covered by the Act and the section banning political
expenditures and contributions, but there have been important
rulings on both of these issues. Damage suit provisions— which
were of chief concern to labor organizations — have not been
before the courts. Section 301 of the Act states that a union may
sue or be sued. Section 303 states that anyone may sue for damages
as a result of injuries arising from secondary boycotts, jurisdic-
tional strikes, or strikes by one union against certification of another
as bargaining agent. Several damage suits have been started —
most of them by employers— but have been dropped before any
final decision was reached.
UNION UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
As stated earlier, the number of unfair labor practice charges
against unions was a small part of the total number of cases dealing
with unfair labor practices. This section appears in the law for the
first time in the Taft-Hartley Act, and there were several important
interpretations on this subject. The Act states that union unfair
labor practices include: (1) coercion of employers and employees;
(2) discrimination against employees; (3) refusal to bargain;
(4) secondary boycotts, strikes against certification, jurisdictional
strikes; (5) excessive initiation fees; and (6) payment for work
not performed.
Union Restraint or Coercion
Section 8(b)(1) deals with union restraint or coercion of em-
ployees in collective bargaining activities, or of employers in the
selection of bargaining representatives. The most comprehensive
decision on this cjuestion was one involving a local union of the
United Shoe Workers of America and the Perry Norvell Company.^
In this case, the NLRB indicated some union activities which are
prohibited, and some which are not. First, the Board held the strike
itself was not coercive, even though it was in violation of a contract.
The Board held the following union acts not coercive on employees
in their selection of a bargaining agent : ( 1 ) assembling a large num-
ber of people around the entrance of the plant, since there was no
attempt to prevent entrance to or exit from the plant; (2) threat-
ening to run the opposing union representative out of town
;
(3) name-calling, such as "scab"; and (4) forming a crowd so as
to cause non-strikers to go out of their way to get to the plant gate.
The Board held these acts to be coercive: (Ij threatenini,^ to beat
up non-strikers; (2) shoxing' a non-striker at the plant entrance;
(3) chasing a non-striker and beating him np.
In another case^ on this subject, some of these same union ac-
tions were again held to 1)e coercive. In this case, the Board said
name-calling was permitted under the doctrine of ])icketing as
"freedom of speech," but threats of violence and pursuit of non-
strikers w^ere coercive. The Board went further in this case and
ruled that passive force, such as standing in the way of non-
strikers' automobiles, constituted restraint and coercion. The Board
added that success or failure in keeping non-strikers out of the
plant was immaterial, so long as the intent to keep them out was
present.
In l)Oth of these cases there was a question of union liability
for acts of its agents under Sections 8(b) and 2(lvM of the Act.
The Board ruled in both cases that the union is liable if the act is
directed or organized by an official of the union, such as a steward
or picket captain, who has authority to direct the picket line. If,
however, the acts are acts of individual members w'ithout direction
or authorization by an officer of the union, the union is not liable.
A similar cjuestion of coercion in mass picketing arose in a case
under Section 8(a) (3), which prohibits discrimination against em-
ployees by employers.^ The Board ruled that an employer's refusal
to re-employ a striker who had participated in mass picketing and
had openly advocated the use of force and violence, was not dis-
criminatory action by the employer, since the picketing went beyond
peaceful persuasion and was coercive activity not protected by the
law.
From these cases, it w^ould seem that the Board intends to
classify as illegal union coercion any form of picketing in which
there is any show of force or threat of force. Picketing is protected
as "freedom of speech" in sititations where the action of the pickets
is limited to peacefid persuasion. Name-calling tactics are inchuled
in this protection.
Union Discrimination
There are two principal cases involving discrimination liy unions
under Section 8(b) (2). This section makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to discriminate against an employee for anything
but non-payment of dues or to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee. There are two principal cases on this question.
In one case* an injunction was issued restraining the International
Typographical Union from attempting to enforce a closed shop,
thereby, the court said, attempting to cause employers to discrimi-
nate against non-union employees. The other case involved the
National Maritime Union and the Texas Company.^ The Board
ruled that the union had violated Section 8(b) (2) by insisting on
a union hiring hall, which in practice had discriminated against non-
union employees. The Board thus held that Section 8(b)(2) pro-
hibits all attempts by unions to force employers to violate another
section of the Act, 8(a) (3), which states that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer, by discrimination in hire or tenure of
employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization, except that an employer may enter into a union shop
agreement if the election procedures of the Act are followed.
Union Refusal to Bargain
Union refusal to bargain. Section 8(b)(3), was also involved
in this Maritime case. The Board held that the union refused to
bargain by insisting that the employer agree to a hiring hall before
negotiating on other terms and by striking for this demand. The
Board said that this section imposed on unions the same duty to
bargain in good faith as that imposed on employers under the
Wagner Act. The Board also held that past employer cases are
significant guideposts in determining union liability under this
section.*^
Secondary Boycotts
The part of the Act which has created more interest and concern
than any other is the section outlawing secondary boycotts, jurisdic-
tional strikes, and strikes against certification of a rival union.
These provisions are included in Section 8(b) (4). Under a follow-
ing section, 10(1), the injunction is made available to the Board
as the first step in preventing these unfair labor practices. The pre-
liminary investigation of all cases arising in these three situations
are to be given priority over all other cases. Also, where the in-
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vestigating officer of the Board has reascjiiable cause lo beHeve that
the charge made against the union is a real one. he iinisf petition
for an injunction in federal court.
There ha\e been ^4 mandatory injunctions issued as of De-
cember 31, 1^H8. involving secondary boycotts, jurisdictional
strikes, and strikes against decertification. Most of these have been
in secondary boycott cases. (A secondary boycott has generally
been defined as a strike or concerted refusal by employees to use,
handle, or transport goods where a purpose of the strike or refusal
is to prevent the employer from doing business with another em-
ployer.) One such case involved the Distillery Workers Union and
the Schenley and Jardine Corporations." In this case employees of
the Schenley Corporation in Kentucky were on strike following a
deadlock of negotiations for a collective bargaining contract in that
plant. Employees of the Jardine Corporation, an independent liquor
distributor in New York who handles Schenley Products, also went
on strike, in an attempt to force the Schenley Corporation in Ken-
tucky to agree to a collective bargaining agreement with its em-
ployees there. The U. S. District Court of Southern New York
issued a temporary restraining order against the striking Jardine
local. Later the dispute in Kentucky was settled, and the companies
rec[uested that the case be dropped. The court did drop the injunc-
tion proceedings, but the Board continued to press the unfair labor
practice charges against the union. The Board ruled that the strike
constituted a secondary boycott despite the fact that: ( 1 ) only one
of the objects was forbidden by law — the union had argued that
one purpose of the strike was to speed up grievance settlement at
Jardine Corporation itself; (2) the unions involved were sister
organizations, and the two companies had a imity of interest as
manufacturer and distributor of the same product; and (3) the
disptite was over terms of employment rather than to further the
organizational interests of the union.
In an(jther case which adds to the definition of an illegal sec-
ondarv boycott,^ \\'atson's Specialt}- Store was a local establish-
ment which handled and installed wall and floor coverings for
homes. The carpenters' local in that town had tried unsuccessfully
to organize Watson's employees and had picketed the store for
some months. A contractor who employed union carpenters took
a job of renovating a house. The contractor purchased floor cover-
ing from Watson's Store, and Watson insisted on doing the instal-
lation work. When Watson's men appeared on the job, the union
carpenters quit work and did not go back, the job being completed
soon afterwards.
The NLRB sought an injunction against this strike, but it was
denied, the court holding that the strike was begun before the effec-
tive date of the Act, and that all the work on the house had been
completed by the time the petition for the injunction was filed.
^
The Board, however, as in the Schenley case referred to above,
continued to litigate the case as an unfair labor practice. (The
Board may do this since the injunction is merely an aid in the pre-
vention of unfair labor practices and apart from the hearings and
rulings made by the Board in the final handling of unfair labor
charges.) The Board ruled that the strike had continued after the
effective date of the Act and so was subject to its provisions. The
Board's decision stated that the union's action went beyond re-
fusing to work on a job with non-union men because the real
purpose was to organize Watson's Store. The Board issued a cease
and desist order against the union. (This case is important also in
that it dealt with a local construction situation. This will be men-
tioned again in the section on the coverage of the Act.)
A wide-sweeping decision involving a union's "We Do Not Pa-
tronize" list has just been handed down by the Board in another
local building dispute. ^° In this case, employees of the Wadsworth
Company, manufacturer of prefabricated houses, went on strike
in a dispute over the terms of a new contract. The Wadsw'Orth
plant was picketed, but the plant continued to operate on a non-
union basis, with the striking employees being replaced.
Klassen, a builder of W^adsworth prefabricated houses, hired a
carpenter who was a member of the union which was engaged in
the dispute with the manufacturer. The local building trades council
voted to place Klassen on its "We Do Not Patronize" list, the
union carpenter left his job, and the building site was picketed. The
picketing was wholly peaceful in character. As a result of the picket-
ing, drivers for several trucking companies refused to carry goods
through the picket lines.
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Wadsworth and Klassen then brought an unfair labor practice
charge against the union, alleging a secondary boycott. The union
argued that its action in boycotting Klassen was a justifiable one
in that its purpose was to protect the standards of the union. The
Board ruled, however, that such a product boycott is one of the
precise evils which Congress intended to eliminate by the Act's
secondary boycott section. The union argued that Klassen was not
a neutral party but was profiting by the position taken by Wads-
worth. The Board ruled, however, that a customer of an employer
with whom the union has a dispute is a neutral party intended by
the law to be protected from union pressures.
The Board overruled other union arguments by saying peaceful
picketing and the "Do Not Patronize" lists must be viewed as a
direct appeal to employees not to perform services for the employer
and thus are included within the actions banned by the section. In
such cases, unions are not protected by the free speech provision of
Section 8(c). the Board said, since they are engaged in an illegal
action.
In another secondary boycott case" which involved picketing in
a local situation, a manufacturing company had undertaken some
construction work in its plant. This work was contracted to a con-
struction firm and a special gate cut for use by the construction
workers. Some time later, the production workers struck the plant,
and began picketing the gates, including the one made for the con-
struction workers. The U. S. District Court granted the injunction
sought by the Board, saying that the act of picketing the special gate
for construction workers constituted an attempt to force the con-
struction firm to cease doing business with the manufacturing com-
pany. This, the Board said, was a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A).
The Board has not issued a final order on the case.
How^ever. union activity which is not an illegal secondary boy-
cott is defined in Douds v. Metropolitan Architects}'^ In this case.
Ebasco Company was an engineering services firm that contracted
part of its work out to Project Company, a large part of whose
work came from Ebasco. A labor dispute arose at Ebasco Company,
and the employees went out on strike. When this happened, an even
greater portion of Project's work— about 75 per cent— was on
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contract from Ebasco. Some work, started at Ebasco, was trans-
ferred to Project Company. The miion of Ebasco employees then
picketed Project Company. When an attempt was made to secure
an injunction against the picketing at Project, the court held that
this picketing did not constitute a secondary boycott because Project
was doing w'ork that, prior to the strike, was done by Ebasco em-
ployees, and this w'as. in effect, strike-breaking. Therefore, the in-
junction was denied. The trial examiner of the Board later made
the same findings and recommended that the case be dismissed.
Injunctions in Unfair Labor Practices
In addition to the required use of the injunction in secondary
boycotts and other cases coming under Section 8(b) (4) of the
Act, the NLRB General Counsel may petition for injunctions in any
other unfair labor practice case. To date this discretionary power
of the general counsel has been used sparingly. There had been only
six such requests for injunctions as of December 31. 1948. The
most important case was the ITU case, mentioned above, involv-
ing discrimination and refusal to bargain. Injunctions were also
granted against the United Mine Workers for refusal to bargain
with the Southern Coal Operator's representative,^' and a tempo-
rary restraining order was granted against the General Motors
Company insurance plan.^^ The request for an injunction was de-
nied in a case in which Boeing Airplane Companv was accused of
refusal to bargain.^' Two other cases were withdrawn.
It was generally believed that private persons had no right to
seek injunctive relief against alleged unfair labor practices under
the new law. There has been some difference of opinion among the
district courts, but in the onl\- case to reach a circuit court of ap-
peals^'' the court upheld the Board's position and overruled a district
court which had granted an injunction to a union against an em-
plo}er who refused to bargain. This injunction had been granted by
the lower court, despite the fact that the union had filed the case
with the Board. The circuit court said that the courts did not have
jurisdiction to grant the injunction, since the union had adequate
administrative remedy before the Board; that is. the union would
file the case with the Board, after w'hich hearings would be held
and a final order issued against the unfair practice.
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A district court in California also denied a union's request for
injunctive relief against an employer's alleged refusal to bargain.
The court held that the Board has exclusive power to determine
whether the unfair labor practice had been committed.^' Another
district court^"^ granted an injunction sought by a company, restrain-
ing the union from picketing in a secondary boycott situation. The
court based its decision on Section 303 of the Act, which allows
damage suits in such cases. The court held that since the company
was suffering irreparable damage for which the remedy provided
by the Act was inadequate, the injunction should be granted. A
private injunction was granted in another secondary boycott case
where the union was striking to prevent the hiring of certain em-
ployees. The court said that its power to issue the injunction was
contained in the damage suit provision (Section 303).^^
In summarizing these secondary boycott and injunction cases,
it can be seen that illegal secondary boycotts have been clearl\-
defined as any attempt to force union demands or organization on
employers by striking or picketing other employers. This has been
extended to include local construction situations, as well as actions
by two locals of the same union. Generally, the courts have re-
fused to issue an injunction, where the dispute was clearly intra-
state, or where a strike-breaking situation was involved. The very
important question of the private injunction, ruled out since the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, is still unanswered. The final
interpretation will depend on a U. S. Supreme Court ruling, since
there is difference of opinion among the lower courts.
Other Union Unfair Practices
The remainder of the union unfair labor practices cases have
not been decided in sufiicient number to set any pattern. This means
that the question of jurisdictional strikes, strikes against certifica-
tion, excessive initiation fees, and payment for work not performed
have yet to be clarified. In one case involving a strike against certi-
fication,"'^ an injunction was granted against a union which was on
strike to force recognition as the bargaining agent where another
union had been certified by the Board. The striking union had not
complied with the Act's filing requirements and so was not placed
on the ballot.
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EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The biggest change in employer unfair labor practices has re-
sulted from Section 8(c) of the Act. the "freedom of speech" clause.
The Act states that the "expression of any views" bv an employer
shall not constitute an unfair practice unless the expression contains
a threat of reprisal or force or a promise of benefit. This means
that interference, restraint, or coercion by employers is not broadl\-
defined as it was under the Wagner Act.
In several cases where unions alleged that employer interference
and coercion had been used, the Board has ruled that certain em-
ployer actions are legal under the free speech provision. An em-
ployer's pre-election letters and notices to employees, stating that
the interest of the employees and the employer would be best
serA'ed by a vote against the union, were permissible, the Board
ruled, since they contained no language which was coercive, either
expressed or implied."^ In one case,^~ the distribution of sample
ballots marked against the union, when not accompanied by threats
of reprisal against those who voted for the union, was held to be
a simple expression of the company's opinion. In another case,"'
however, the Board, while finding that the company's pre-election
campaign was not coercive and so was protected as "free speech,"
still cancelled the election results on the ground that the extreme
campaign methods had created an atmosphere in which it was im-
possible for the emplo}ees to vote freely. In another case.^* the
Board ruled that a supervisor's statement that "if unionized, the
employees would have to take a cut in salary" and other such state-
ments constituted coercion of the employees. However, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board and held that such
statements where "no employee was led to believe that union mem-
bership w^ould affect his employment" were protected free speech
and did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The Board has
clearly shown that the "captive audience" doctrine no longer applies.
Under the Wagner Act, it was held to be an unfair lal)or practice
for an employer to require attendance at a meeting called by the
employer on company time. The Board ruled in the Babcock and
Wilcox case^'' that although the employer rec(uired the employees
to attend and listen to the speeches, it was not a violati(^n of the Act.
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Some limits on em[)l()\er tree speech lia\e i)eeii recoj^nized by
the Board, however. It was ruled tiiat an employer coerced em-
ployees by posting a notice saying that he would never recognize
a union and would move the jjlant to avoid bargaining."" The Board
held that the statement of a foreman, saying that the entrance of a
union would result in cutting the work-week to 4(1 hours, was a
threat of economic reprisal.'"' The Board has also ruled'""* that
cjuestioning employees about union membership was interference
and not merely dissemination of "views, argument, or opinion"
allowed in the free speech provision of the Act.
Employer Domination of Labor Organizations
The Board has departed from former standards it followed
under the Wagner Act, in applying Section 8(a)(2) of the Taft-
Hartley Act which designates company domination, interference,
or support of a union as an unfair labor practice. In the Carpenter
Steel Company Case,^'' the Board ruled that when a compan\' has
dominated, interfered, or supported a union (regardless of whether
or not the union is affiliated with an outside organization ) dis-
establishment of the union will be the appropriate remedy. However,
where the unfair labor practice is limited to interference and sup-
port and has never reached the point of domination, the Board shall
order only that recognition be withheld. This policy was later ap-
plied in the Hershey jMetal Products Case^** when the Board ruled
that certain employer actions — permitting members of the inde-
pendent union to organize on company time, offering legal assist-
ance, and granting a pay increase demanded by the independent —
constituted interference and support, but not domination, and the
Board ordered onlv that the company withhold recognition until
Board certification.
Discrimination Because of Union Membership
There have been no interi)retive rulings in\ohing Section
8(a)(3), emplover discrimination, and the union security- pro-
visions, other than those cases discussed earlier on union discrimi-
nation. This is one of the controversial sections of the Act that has
not been the subject of interpretive rulings.
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Employer Refusal to Bargain
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith. In one case,^^
an employer was ordered to bargain on a pension plan. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, saying that the terms
"wages" and "other conditions of employment" as used in the col-
lective bargaining provisions of the Act clearly include pension and
retirement plans. The Board applied the same principles in another
case by ruling that the employer was required to bargain on group
health and insurance plans. ^^ Earlier, at the request of the Board,
the court issued a temporary restraining order against General
Motors Corporation to prevent the company from changing its in-
surance plan without consulting the union. ^^
In general, however, interpretations of "bargaining in good
faith" have been favorable to the employer. The Board ruled that
an employer had not given evidence of bad faith bargaining when
he refused to discuss terms until the union withdrew its union shop
demand. The Board found that the employer had bargained in good
faith at all other times and his refusal on this point did not change
the over-all picture.^* In another case,^^ the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, reversing the Board, ruled an employer could refuse to
grant an increase in negotiations with the union, and then subse-
quently give an increase to his employees on his own, without vio-
lating the Act's provision for "bargaining in good faith." The Court
based its ruling on the ground that negotiations had broken down
and a strike vote had been called when the increase was given. The
court also said that the raise was made to meet competition from
other firms in that area.
In summarizing the employer unfair labor practices, it can be
said that employers now have considerably more freedom than was
accorded them under the same provisions in the Wagner Act. This
added freedom has largely been the result of the employer free
speech provision in the Act. "Bargaining in good faith" has also
been favorably interpreted, so that the employer enjoys freedom of
action not available before. The major exception to this trend has
been in the area of bargaining subjects where the Board and the
courts have included pension and welfare plans as issues on which
16
the company must barj^aiii collectively. This matter is still to he
finally decided by the courts and its final outcome is uncertain.
REPRESENTATION ELECTION
On the subject of elections to determine a bargaininji;- represen-
tative, under Section 9 of the Act, the majority of the cases have
followed principles established under the Wagner Act. There have
been modifications, however.
Exceptions to the One-Year Rule
Despite the Act's limitation of one valid election in each twelve-
month period, the Board has allowed a second election in certain
instances. In one case"*' the Board allowed a second election l)ecause
the results of the first— held within the year— had not been con-
clusi\e. In another,'' the Board allowed a second election because
the union winning the first election was not certified with the Board
due to its failure to file the affidavits as required b}' the Act. Since
the passage of the Act, the Board has continued its former policy of
not holding an election while a contract is in force, e\en though
the contract is for a period oi two years. '^^
Who May Vote in Elections
On the question of who may vote in elections, the Board has
followed the exact letter of the law, which states that "employees
on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible
to vote" — Section 9(c)(3). In a leading case,^^ the union was
engaged in a strike over wages. While the strike was going on, the
employer hired replacements for some of the strikers and the jobs
of others were discontinued. The Board ruled that all those em-
ployees who had replaced the strikers on a permanent basis, and
strikers who had been reinstated, were eligible to vote; while those
employees who had been permanently replaced were not entitled
to reinstatement and were not eligible to vote. The Board stated
a company's claim that the strikers were i)ermanently replaced is
not the deciding factor ; "the actual facts in ever\- case nuist be
weighed." The Board added that this provision [jlaces no limitation
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on the right to strike, but conceded that it may discourage the exer-
cise of the right in some instances.
Appropriate Bargaining Unit
The question of the appropriate bargaining unit has been the
subject of considerable Htigation, but in the main there has been
little in the way of actual interpretation of the provision. On pro-
fessional employees, the Board has ruled that where the majority of
employees in a unit are professional, no special election is necessary
to determine if these employees want to be included in the unit.*°
Section 2(12) defines professional employees as any engaged in
work that is (1) predominantly intellectual, (2) involves consistent
use of discretion and judgment, (3) of such a character that output
cannot be standardized, and (4) requiring knowledge normally
gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction. The Board
has used these standards in holding that time study men are pro-
fessional and not supervisory employees ;*^ in ruling that estimators
for a construction firm are professional ;*" and in finding that
newspaper editorial employees are not professional.'*^
On the subject of craft units, the Board has shown, by a series
of rulings, that it will grant a severance election to a craft unit even
though there has been a long history of bargaining on a plant-wide
basis, and although the craft employees constitute a very small
group. (In these elections the craft unit decides whether it wishes
to remain a part of a larger bargaining unit or form a separate
bargaining unit of its own.) Craft groups which have been granted
such elections include pattern makers,** die room employees,*'' ma-
chine shop employees,**^ and engineers.*^ The Board denied a craft-
unit election to electricians who worked with other craft groups
in an "integrated production process."*^ The Board also denied a
severance election to another craft group, pointing out that the Act
gave it discretion to do so.*^ The Act places only one restriction on
this use of its discretion by the Board— that prior practice not be
the onlv guide. In this case, the Board also considered bargaining
history, separateness of the craft jobs, and the nature of the em-
ployee's duties.
The provision concerning plant guards, section 9(b) (3), states
that guards may not be a part of a bargaining which includes other
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workers in the plant and that no organization may be certified as
bargaining agent for guards if the organization is affiliated w ith one
which admits employees other than guards. On this provision the
Board has consistently defined guard as "anyone who spends 50
per cent or more of his time performing watchmen's duties. "''° The
Board has also denied certification to a union, chartered for guards
only, because it was affiliated with the AFL."^
Decertirication
There are a few important decisions involving decertification
elections. The Board ruled that a decertification petition could be
withdrawn, although the employer claimed that the union had co-
erced the employees into withdrawing. (The Board is authorized
to conduct such elections on petition by an employee or group of
employees asserting that the union no longer represents them.) In
another case,°" the union notified the Board that it no longer claimed
to represent the employees. Such a disavowal, the Board ruled,
eliminated the representation c^uestion, and the pending election was
set aside and the petition dismissed. The employer argued that the
decertification election should be conducted anyway. The Board
held that to direct the election despite the union's disclaimer would
mean that for the following 12-month period, the employer could
"refuse to engage in collective bargaining, not only with this union
but with any other." (This would be true because of the provision
limiting elections to one per year.) The Board said that it is not the
purpose of the Act to aid such an objective.
Affidavit Requirements
The filing and affidavit requirements. Sections 9(f),(g), and
(h), have probably created more problems than any other pro-
vision of Section 9. These sections require unions to file certain in-
formation regarding finances, officers, and organization and bar-
gaining procedures and all union officers to sign non-comnumist
affidavits if they wash to use the machinery of the Board. These pro-
visions have been the subject of considerable litigation.
Constitutionality of these filing requirements has been decided
in two cases. In National Maritime Union v. Hcrzog,'''' the Supreme
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Court upheld the cunstitutionality of Sections 9(f) and (g), re-
quiring tlie fihng of union finances, names of officers, and collective
bargaining procedures. The Court ruled that it was not required in
this case to rule on the constitutionality of Section 9(h), the non-
communist afiidavit provision. There was no opinion given by the
Court explaining either ruling. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has upheld the validity of the non-communist affidavit. This
Court ruled that the filing requirement was constitutional in that it
was an exercise of Congress's power to control interstate commerce
and to legislate under the "general welfare" clause of the consti-
tution.^* The filing requirements, the Court said, were reasonable
cjualifications for those who seek to enjoy the "extraordinary privi-
lege" of being exclusive bargaining agents.
The Board has ruled that parent organizations, AFL and CIO,
normally are not "international labor organizations" within the
meaning of the law, and thus are not required to file.'' The Board
said in another ruling that an individual petitioning for a represen-
tation election need not comply with filing requirements."'*^ In this
case the union was seeking to dismiss an individual's petition for
decertification of the union. In a somewhat similar case, however,
the Board held that an individual should be denied a place on a
representation ballot where evidence showed that he was "fronting"
for a non-complying union.'' There are other cases where sufficient
evidence was not found to show that the individual was "fronting"
and the name was placed on the ballot.
The law clearly states that no investigation shall be made con-
cerning representation if the union has not complied with the filing
requirements. This, of course, bars a non-complying union from a
place on the ballot in a certification election. In decertification elec-
tions, however, the Board has ruled that a non-complying union's
name should be placed on the ballot. However, if the non-complying
union should "win" the election, only the arithmetic results of the
election, and not the union, are to be certified.'® The Board stated
that to rule otherwise would give non-complying unions the power
to prevent being decertified
The Board has consistently dismissed representation petitions
by the complying internationals when there is any evidence that
they are acting on behalf of non-complying locals.''''
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The whole question of representation, certification, and decerti-
fication has not met with any major interpretive changes in this
period of Taft-Hartley administration. As mentioned earlier, most
of the decisions have followed the interpretive pattern set under
the Wagner Act, or have followed closely the language of the
present law.
COVERAGE OF THE ACT
There are several serious questions involving coverage of the
Act. Perhaps the most important of these is the extension of the
Board's jurisdiction to the local construction industr}-. It seems
reasonably clear now that the Board intends to extend the coverage
of the law to include almost any type of local business as long as
there is an indirect relationship to interstate commerce. In the
Watson Specialty Store case, mentioned earlier under secondary
boycotts, the Board extended its jurisdiction to construction work
on a private home. In this case the Board stated, "the legislative
history shows that Congress intended the Board to exercise its
plenary power to protect small and relatively local enterprises
against the impact of unfair boycotts aimed at the installation of
materials furnished by primary employers, the interstate commerce
character of whose business is clear."
Earlier, the Board had held that a concern which manufactured
and sold doors and sashes was covered by the Act, although all the
sales were intrastate.*'" The interstate commerce was involved in
the materials used, 27 per cent of which were purchased outside the
state. This extension of the coverage has been questioned in some
of the district courts. In two quite similar cases, a district court in
Denver refused injunctions to the Board in alleged secondary boy-
cott cases on the grounds that the disputes were not covered by the
law. One case, Sperry v. Denver Building Council,'^^ was concerned
with the electrical w^ork done on construction jobs that were mostly
private residences. The other case. Slater v. Denver Building Coun-
cil,^^ involved a local business which manufactured and installed
soda fountains and counters. However, in a later case, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals sustained an injunction granted against
a secondary boycott on a local construction job."' This court said
that it was the intent of Congress to apply the provisions of the
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law to local situations where there i> anv effect on interstate
commerce.
The Board has also accepted jurisdiction over cases that in-
volved a local trucking concern which hauled building supplies and
coaP and a retail automobile dealer.'^'^
Supervisors
Another question raised in regard to coverage is the exemp-
tion of supervisors, Section 2(3). The Board has ruled that duties
— hiring, firing, promotions, and transfer recommendations— shall
govern in deciding supervisory capacity, rather than title. This, of
course, is the definition given to the term "supervisor" in Section
2(11). In some sample cases, the Board declared check inspectors
to be supervisors because they could effectivelv recommend dis-
missal. ''''^ The Board also ruled that section men in a plant were
classified as supervisors and excluded from the production unit
because they reported violations of rules to an overseer and relayed
instructions to the men.*^' In another case, the Board ruled that store
managers of a laundry and dry cleaning companv who had no
authority to hire or fire were not supervisors.*^*
Independent Contractors
A third important Cjuestion of coverage arises from the exclu-
sion of independent contractors from coverage by the Act— Sec-
tion 2{3). The legislative history of the law shows that this
provision was aimed at new^s vendors and that it was largely the
result of one case, the Hearst Publications case,"^'^ in which the
Supreme Court ruled that the Board had the power to decide
whether paper vendors w^ere employees. In the first case decided
under the Taft-Hartley Act,'° the Board held that newsboys who
have home routes under contract with the publishers are not em-
ployees, but are independent contractors under the Act. The Board
stated this to be true because (1) the carriers aren't paid wages,
but get their earnings from profits, (2) they determine their own
methods of servicing their routes and have very little supervision
from the company, and (3) the company exercises no real control
over the manner in which routes are transferred or divided. Thus,
the real test was the degree of control exercised over the carrier
by the company.
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The Board ai)plied these same standards in decidin<4- that insur-
ance salesmen were employees and not independent contractors.'^
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in this case. In its
ruling the Court relied on the fact that the company demanded that
the salesmen devote all their time to the husiness, and that the\-
produce a specified minimum of new business each \ear. Ihe com-
pany trains the men and keeps a close check b\- records and reports
on the salesmen at all times.
In summarizing the decisions on the coverage of the Act, we
find that the Board has extended its jurisdiction to include many
local business operations never before considered within the scope
of the law. The most notable is the inclusion of the local building
trades. On the cjuestions of supervisors and independent contractors,
the Board has established certain standard measurements, men-
tioned earlier, which are to be used in determining each indixidual
case.
RESTRICTION ON POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The final major area which has been the subject of any inter-
pretive rulings is Section 34, which bans political contril)Utions by
unions. The big case involving political expenditures was the CIO
News case,'^ a test case on the constitutionality of this pro\ision of
the Act. The district court upheld the union's contention that it was
unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of speech, but the Su-
preme Court ruled that this decision was too broad. In a 5 to 4
decision, the majority of the Court ruled that the case against the
CIO should be dismissed, not because the ban on political expendi-
tures was unconstitutional, but because the CIO did not A'iolate the
law. The Court ruled that the Act did not intend to prohibit political
comment in union papers published in the regular course of con-
ducting union affairs.
In another case which places the issue scjuarely on the question
of constitutionality the Federal District Court of Connecticut re-
jected all the union's arguments and declared that the section was
constitutional as an exercise of the power of Congress to regulate
federal elections.'^ The union had spent union funds for [iolitical
advertising in newspapers and on the radio.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing case summaries have been an attempt to explain,
in part at least, some of the administrative interpretations and
problems arising under the Taft-Hartley Act. As has been pointed
out, some areas of the Act have been handled in such a way that
some sort of conclusive pattern has been established. This is true of
most of the representation and coverage cjuestions as well as the
constitutionality of various parts of the law. There are other areas
where there is some indication of what the law means to the Board
and the courts, as in union coercion and secondary boycotts as well
as employer free speech rights and bargaining duties. However,
there are still major questions to be finally settled in these areas,
such as the question of picketing as free speech or coercion and the
whole matter of secondary boycotts, in which the fact situations
vary so widely in the individual cases that it probably will be a long
time before these provisions are clearly defined. The same is true
of employer freedom of speech.
There is still a third group of provisions where there have been
so few cases, or the treatment has been so varied, that no conclusion
can be made. This group includes, among other things, private use
of the injunction, strikes against certification, jurisdictional strikes,
excessive initiation fees, union liability, and political expenditures.
Another factor contributing to the inconclusiveness of the
meaning of various provisions is the fact that the great majority
of the rulings handed down have been by the Board or the lower
courts. Until these issues have been ruled upon by the higher courts,
it is difficult to say if the current interpretation will stand.
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